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Symposium Introduction 
DAVID SCHUMAN* 
Setting the Stage 
hank you; I always wanted to be an emcee. Almost exactly one 
year ago today, the Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Horton vs. Oregon Health & Science University.1 It’s that case that 
inspires today’s symposium, although inspires may not be the 
appropriate word. It’s like saying that Pearl Harbor inspired World 
War II. I think a more appropriate word would be “provoked.” 
In Horton, the plaintiff’s son suffered serious injuries as a result of 
conceded negligence on the part of two state employee physicians 
who worked at Oregon Health and Sciences University (OHSU).2 The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, finding economic damages of 
$6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages in the amount of $6 
million.3 OHSU filed a motion asking the court to apply a provision 
of the Oregon Tort Claims Act that caps damages in actions against 
the state and its agencies and employees at $3 million.4 The court 
granted that motion with respect to OHSU on the ground that it has 
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1 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
2 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1001. 
3 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
4 Id. 
T
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sovereign immunity.5 But, with respect to one of the doctors, the 
court held that applying the damage cap to the plaintiff denied her 
right to a jury trial,6 as well as her right to a remedy in due course of 
law.7 Jury trials are guaranteed under two provisions of the Oregon 
Constitution: article I, section 17, “In all civil cases, the right to Trial 
by Jury shall remain inviolate”,8 and article VII (amended), section 3, 
“In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court in this state, unless the 
court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the 
verdict.”9 Article I, section 10, the relevant provision in article I, 
section 10, the remedy clause, provides that “[j]ustice shall be 
administered . . . completely”—a phrase that’s notably absent from all 
of the case law on article I, section 10, (“[j]ustice shall be 
administered . . . completely . . . and every man shall have remedy by 
due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or 
reputation”).10 
In the process of deciding Horton, the court overruled two 
relatively recent precedents: Lakin v Senco Products,11 a 1999 case 
regarding the right to jury trial, and Smothers v. Gresham Transfer,12 
a 2001 case about article I, section 10. To justify overruling these two 
cases, the court states, “We do not overrule our precedents lightly.”13 
Nobody who’s been paying attention to what the Oregon Supreme 
Court has been doing recently can take that statement seriously. Off 
the top of my head, I can think of the Stranahan case,14 the Savastano 
case,15 the Couey case,16 the Hall case,17 Ashbaugh case,18 the Unger 
case,19 and that’s just scratching the surface. 
 
5 Id. at 221, 376 P.3d at 1028. 
6 Id. at 247, 376 P.3d at 1042. 
7 Horton, 359 Or. at 218–19, 376 P.3d at 1027; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
8 OR. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
9 OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1910, amended 1996). 
10 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
11 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 276 P.3d at 1044 (2016). 
12 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001). 
13 Horton, 359 Or. at 186, 376 P.3d at 1009. 
14 Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 11 P.3d 228 (2000) (overruling Lloyd 
Corp. v. Whiffen, 315 Or. 500, 849 P.3d 446 (1993)). 
15 State v. Savastano, 354 Or. 64, 309 P.3d 1083 (2013) (overruling State v. Freeland, 
295 Or. 367, 667 P.2d 509 (1983)). 
16 Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or. 460, 355 P.3d 866 (2015) (overruling Yancy v. Shatzer, 
337 Or. 345, 97 P.3d 1161 (2004)). 
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The court does spell out in Horton a number of factors that it will 
take into consideration in deciding whether or not to overrule 
precedent.20 They specify that these factors are not exclusive: Was the 
earlier case dictum? Did the earlier case lack analysis? Was the earlier 
case clearly wrong? Was the earlier case inconsistent with other 
earlier cases? Have people relied on the earlier case? How old is the 
earlier case? 
In other words, I think what the court said was that they can pretty 
much overrule cases whenever they want to. The actual criterion 
seems to me to be that they can overrule when all of the justices who 
were on the case that they’re overruling have retired. 
In overruling Smothers, the court rejected a template that the court 
had set out in Smothers. The court in Smothers said that the first 
question was whether or not the plaintiff has suffered an injury to an 
“absolute common-law right” that was protected by the constitution 
when it was drafted in 1857;21 if so, has the legislature provided a 
“constitutionally adequate substitute remedy”?22 This obviously left a 
lot of unanswered questions: What exactly is an absolute common-
law right? What is the appropriate level of generality to apply when 
trying to determine if the right was protected at common law in 1857? 
For example, is the appropriate inquiry: was there a remedy for 
negligence, or was there a right to remedy for unreasonably unsafe 
products, or was there a right to a remedy for injury inflicted by a 
defective nail gun? These questions are unanswered, and they allowed 
for a lot of flexibility, some would say, on the part of the court. 
The new rule in Horton, under article I, section 10, cases, is that 
these cases seem to fall into three categories. Category one [cases 
occur when] the legislature continues to recognize a duty but provides 
no remedy or one that is “paltry.”23 These legislative initiatives are 
unconstitutional. Again, no definition of what might be “paltry.” 
Paltry has substituted for insignificant, or actually, from some of the 
earlier case, emasculated. A second category of case, what I call “quid 
 
17 State v. Hall, 339 Or. 7, 115 P.3d 908 (2005) (overruling State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 
383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981)). 
18 State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297, 244 P.3d 360 (2010) (overruling State v. Holmes, 
311 Or. 400, 813 P.2d 28 (1991)). 
19 State v. Unger, 356 Or. 59, 333 P.3d 1009 (2014) (overruling State v. Hall, 339 Or. 
7, 115 P.3d 908 (2005)). 
20 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 187, 376 P.3d 998, 1010 (2016). 
21 Id. at 216, 376 P.3d at 1026. 
22 Id. at 176, 376 P.3d at 1004. 
23 Id. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
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pro quo” cases, occur when the legislature has tinkered with a remedy 
as part of a larger statutory scheme that gives benefits to some people 
while limiting them to others, in which case the court will weigh the 
reduced benefit and determine whether it is substantial in light of the 
overall statutory scheme.24 I suspect that this category was described 
with workers’ compensation statutes in mind. The third category 
occurs when the legislature has modified or eliminated common-law 
duties; then, the court must consider the reason for the legislative 
change measured against the extent to which the legislature has 
departed from the common law.25 I believe that’s a fancy way of 
talking about ad hoc balancing—what was the state’s interest, what is 
the degree of harm inflicted upon the individual. Horton discarded the 
1857 bright-line rule. 
With respect to jury trial, the court simply overruled the earlier 
case, Lakin v. Senco Products.26 Lakin had held that the amount of 
damages is a fact found by a fact finder—that the right to a jury trial 
is “inviolate.” So, limiting noneconomic damages to $500,000 where 
plaintiffs had been awarded $2 million for one plaintiff and $876,000 
for the other plaintiff deprived them of a right to a jury trial.27 Horton, 
after an exhaustive review, and, I might say, exhausting review, of 
earlier cases in history going back to Blackstone and beyond, the 
court holds, “Neither the text nor the history of the jury trial right 
suggests that it was intended to place a substantive limitation on the 
legislature’s authority to alter or adjust a party’s rights and 
remedies.”28 
The result of Horton is that the plaintiff in that case eats, out of 
pocket, economic damages to the tune of $3 million—that’s economic 
damages—and noneconomic damages to the tune of $6 million. As 
you can tell from the roster of today’s program, the case has attracted 
a certain amount of attention around the country. The rest of the 
program today will examine these constitutional guarantees as they 
apply to damage caps in Oregon and elsewhere. 
 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463, modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 276 P.3d at 1044 (2016). 
27 Id. at 79, 987 P.2d at 474. 
28 Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
